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Abstract
Sequential decision-making is a noticeable feature of strategic interactions among
agents. The full estimation of sequential games, however, has been challenging due to
the sheer computational burden, especially when the game is large and asymmetric.
In this paper, I propose an estimation method for discrete choice sequential games
that is computationally feasible, easy-to-implement, and e¢ cient, by modifying the
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator, the most widely used probit simulator.
I show that the recursive nature of the GHK simulator is easily dovetailed with the
sequential structure of strategic interactions.
￿This paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at Northwestern University. I am thankful to
Leemore Dafny, David Dranove, Michael Mazzeo, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Porter for their guidance. School
of Economics, University of New South Wales. E-mail: s.maruyama@unsw.edu.au
11 Introduction
The structural estimation of discrete-choice non-cooperative games has rapidly developed
since the seminal works by Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In these
models, an econometrician studies the observed discrete decisions of agents (e.g. whether
to enter a particular market), assuming latent payo⁄s of agents and taking strategic inter-
actions into consideration. By imposing a certain game structure, unobservable structural
parameters, such as sunk entry costs, are estimated. The econometrician can test strate-
gic behavior predicted by theory, such as preemptive behavior. Counterfactual simulations
can be conducted to evaluate the e⁄ect of strategic behavior. These analyses, however, are
relevant only if the assumed game structure is valid, at least as an approximation.
The most widely studied in this literature is the class of incomplete information simultaneous-
move games.1 Complete information simultaneous-move games, on the other hand, have seen
much fewer studies, mainly due to its computational complexity. Recent examples are Ba-
jari, Hong, and Ryan (2008) and Soetevent and Kooreman (2007). Furthermore, research
on sequential-move games has been quite limited. In the industrial organization literature,
few examples include Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002), Schmidt-Dengler (2006), and Maruyama
(2008). Consequently, there exists very little empirical discussion on whether a researcher
should employ simultaneous games or sequential games. The literature of the labor partic-
ipation of couples also has studies of sequential move games, or Stackelberg games in this
1There are numerous recent papers on both methodology and empirical application. Much of recent
progress occurs on dynamic games. Among others, see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard,
and Levin (2007), and Su and Judd (2008). For static games, Bajari et al. (2007) is an example.
2case (e.g. Kooreman (1994) and Hiedman (1998)). These studies directly compare sequen-
tial games with simultaneous or cooperative games, but focus only on simple games with
two players. The estimation of the general class of sequential games has su⁄ered from its
computational complication.
In this paper, I propose an estimation method for the general class of discrete-choice
perfect information sequential games. Relying on the literature of simulation-assisted esti-
mation, the proposed method is e¢ cient, computationally practical, and easy-to-use. By
facilitating the estimation of sequential games and, especially, enabling the estimation of
large and asymmetric sequential games, this method makes the sequential game a practi-
cal option for researchers and reinforces grounds for the selection of the game speci￿cation,
which is often ad hoc in the current literature.
Moreover, the estimation of sequential games is not only another similar option, but has
some distinctive features and advantages over simultaneous games. First, the sequential
nature of decision-making among agents is quite often a key aspect in describing real-world
strategic interactions. A cartel breaks down following a price cut by a ￿rm. Manufactures
utilize reverse engineering. A monopolist￿ s preemptive behavior deters entry in the market.
Not only ￿rms play sequential games. Konrad et al. (2002) empirically show that, in a
family with parents and two children in Germany, the elder child often chooses to move
farther away from the parents so that he or she induces the younger sibling to take care
of the parents. Empirical analysis of sequential games is also a developing ￿eld in political
science and international relations (e.g. Bas et al. (2008), and Signorino and Tarar (2006)).
3Second, while the exact decision order of agents is rarely observed, a researcher can esti-
mate sequential games imposing di⁄erent decision order assumptions including randomized
orders. In this way, a decision order can be tested. In contrast, the simultaneous-move
assumption is an untestable a priori assumption, unless in a quite simple game setting.
Third, perfect information sequential games have technical advantages and disadvantages,
which are also practically important factors in choosing the game speci￿cation. In case of
simultaneous games, the assumption of imperfect information often makes the computation
much simpler. However, this assumption complicates and limits the inclusion of agent char-
acteristics that are unobserved to researchers but observed to the other agents, which may
be crucial factors in the real-world rivalry. Next, whether complete information or incom-
plete information, simultaneous games need to handle the existence of an equilibrium and
the possible multiplicity of equilibria, while perfect information sequential games can utilize
the notion of subgame perfection, which guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium.2
While this is an advantage of sequential games, the recent literature has o⁄ered various
techniques for simultaneous games to handle the multiple equilibrium issue (Ciliberto and
Tamer (2007), Sweeting (2005), and Pakes et al. (2006)). Nevertheless, which equilibrium
occurs is still di¢ cult to rationalize. Sequential games do not have this ambiguity.
On the other hand, the estimation of sequential games is computationally demanding,
because it involves multidimensional integrals, which occur because an equilibrium outcome
observed to an econometrician has multiple random terms due to multiple agents and mul-
2Theoretically multiple equilibriua are possible in tie break cases, but this can be ignored in empirical
application with continuous latent variables.
4tiple alternatives (as well as multiple time points when a panel data set is employed). This
di¢ culty is analogous to the random-utility multivariate probit model, in which the lantent
utility of each alternative has a normal random component. In the probit literature, simula-
tion techniques are widely used to numerically approximate multidimensional integrals, but
the estimation of sequential-move games is complicated by interdependence among strategies
of agents.
Previous studies circumvent or alleviate multidimensional integrals by assuming some
degree of symmetry among agents, making assumptions that simplify the game structure,
and/or not using identity information of each agent in estimating parameters (Berry (1992),
Mazzeo (2002), and Schmidt-Dengler (2006)). However, when a researcher focuses on in-
teractions among heterogeneous agents or when a researcher hopes to capitalize on his or
her rich data set that contains detailed agent characteristics, the game becomes a large
asymmetric game, making multidimensional integrals more formidable to overcome. This is
one of the reasons why the empirical literature of sequential games has been limited com-
pared to its voluminous theoretical counterpart and the well-developed empirical literature
of simultaneous games.
To overcome the issue of multidimensional integrals, the literature of limited dependent
variable models utilizes the simulation-assisted estimation method. For multinomial probit
models, the most widely used simulation technique by far is the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane
(GHK) simulator. It is called GHK, after Geweke (1989, 1991), Hajivassiliou (as reported
in Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998), and Keane (1990, 1994). This simulator is compu-
5tationally tractable; the simulated probability is bounded away 0 and 1 and is smooth with
respect to parameters. A number of studies have compared numerous probit simulators, and
have con￿rmed its usefulness and relative accuracy (Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud
(1996), Geweke, Keane, and Runkle (1994), B￿rsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993)). In
standard multinomial probit models, each alternative may have "interactions" with others
through the variance-covariance matrix of multivariate normal error terms, which the GHK
simulator fully incorporates. In the context of discrete games, however, if the estimation
of strategic e⁄ects is a researcher￿ s main concern, the interaction must be modeled outside
the error components based on the structure of the payo⁄ function and equilibrium solution
framework, which is beyond scope of the GHK simulator.
This paper develops a modi￿ed version of the GHK simulator, "sequential GHK", showing
that the recursive nature of the GHK simulator can be dovetailed with perfect information
sequential games. The algorithm of GHK relies on the decomposition of a multivariate
normal distribution, f(v1;:::;vJ) = f(v1)f(v2jv1):::f(vJ￿1jvJ￿2;:::;v1)f(vJjvJ￿1;:::;v1), and
draws recursively from truncated univariate normal distributions. In a sequential-move game,
an equilibrium is solved by using backward induction based on its sequential nature. Given
that the order of simulation draws in GHK is arbitrary, the GHK simulator can easily ￿t
the sequential game. The modi￿cation this paper proposes does not a⁄ect the nature of the
simulator; the asymptotic properties are the same as the regular GHK simulator. In contrast
to the two-step estimation methods that are becoming common in the estimation of discrete
games of incomplete information (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Bajari et al. (2007)),
6the method presented here is a direct full estimation of the game, so information loss is
minimal.3 Estimation is easily accommodated in the standard frameworks of the method of
simulated likelihood or the method of simulated scores.
Exploiting the GHK simulator, the method proposed in this paper is e¢ cient, compu-
tationally powerful, and easy-to-use. Speci￿cally, sequential games played by many agents
with many characteristics variables can be estimated, and counterfactual simulations can
be straightforwardly conducted. Maruyama (2008) applies this method to the U.S. health
insurance market in Medicare to simulate the e⁄ects of subsidy on social welfare. In the
estimation of its entry model, where, in each county, at most 16 heterogeneous ￿rms play
a sequential-move game with structural pro￿t functions, the computational burden is not
found to be a signi￿cant problem.
After formally presenting the setup in the next section, the use of the GHK simulator is
explained in Section 3. Although the proposed method is intuitive and practical, it requires
several a priori assumptions in the setup. The prerequisite decision order assumption is a
particular example. In Section 4, I clarify the relevance and limitations of the assumptions of
the model used in the preceding sections and then discuss possible extensions. To show how
the proposed method outperforms the previous methods in the literature, a Monte Carlo
simulation is conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Some practical guidelines for
actual estimation are provided in the Appendix.
3The method discussed in this paper is not directly comparable to the two-step estimation methods in
terms of e¢ ciency, because these methods have been developed for games of incomplete information, while
this paper focuses on perfect-information games.
72 The Setup
I present the use of the "sequential GHK," a modi￿ed GHK simulator in the setting of a
simplistic static binary-choice game. Possible extensions and applications of the model to
di⁄erent settings are discussed in the next section.
Suppose there are N independent repetitions of games, for example, markets (i =
1;:::;N). In each market, a sequential-move binary-choice game is played by heterogeneous
agents (j = 1;:::;Ji). The results below naturally generalize to the case where the number
of alternatives is greater than two and the case where the number of agents varies across
games. I assume a perfect-information game. There is no private information and all pre-
ceding decisions are known to everyone. A subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) in a market is achieved when every agent expects no gain from individually deviating
from its equilibrium strategy in its every subgame. In perfect-information sequential-move
games, there always exists a unique SPNE.4 The equilibrium can be obtained by backward
induction, i.e., in a game tree, by deciding the optimal strategies from the most downstream
agent to the most upstream agent. An econometrician observes the decisions agents make
and some agent characteristics. The payo⁄s are not observable. The econometrician￿ s task
is to draw an inference about the parametrically assumed payo⁄ function.
I introduce some notation to simplify the formal presentation. For a vector of indexes
(1;:::;J), the notation "< j" denotes the subvector (1;:::;j￿1), "￿ j" denotes the subvector
(1;:::;j), and "￿j" denotes the subvector that excludes component j. Thus, for a vector
4Tie break cases occur with probability measure zero, so they are ignored.
8", "<j is the subvector of the ￿rst j ￿ 1 components, and "￿j is the subvector excluding
component j. For a matrix L; Lj;<j denotes a vector containing the ￿rst j ￿ 1 elements
of row j, and L￿j;￿j denotes the subarray excluding row j and column j. When I use a
boldface symbol, it denotes a vector, for example, "i = ("1i;"2i;:::;"Jii): The subscript for
each market, i, is dropped for simplicity when no ambiguity would arise.
In a sequential-move game, agent j￿ s decision in a market is represented by yj. To simplify
the presentation, an agent￿ s choice is assumed to be a binary choice ￿ "move" or "do not
move" ￿ and so yj is an indicator variable that takes one if the agent moves. Without
loss of generality, the order of subscripts for agents (1;2;:::;Ji) comprises the reverse of the
decision order in market i ￿ agent Ji makes a decision ￿rst and agent 1 at the end. In
the game tree, agent 1 is at the very bottom. Some agent characteristics are observable
to the econometrician and are denoted xj = (x1j;:::;xKj). xj may also contain observed
market characteristics. A Ji ￿ K matrix, Xi, summarizes the observed characteristics of
market i and the agents in market i. To capture the other unobservable factors that a⁄ect
an agent￿ s payo⁄ and decision, a single-indexed error component, "￿ji, is introduced in the
payo⁄ function for each decision of agent j. The payo⁄ of agent j from choosing yj = ￿ is,
after dropping index i:
￿j(yj = ￿;X;"￿j;y￿j;￿) ￿ ￿(yj = ￿;X;y￿j;￿) + "￿j: (1)
Here, ￿ is an assumed parametric function of payo⁄s with parameters to be estimated, ￿.
A subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is obtained when every player
9expects no gain from individually deviating from the equilibrium in every subgame. Formally,




























￿j;￿) < 0;if agent j does not move in y
e
(3)
for all j = 1;:::;J;
where y￿
￿j(y>j) is the unique SPNE solution for the subgame that starts from agent j given
the decisions of the preceding agents, y>j. This is recursively de￿ned and y￿
￿1(y>1) is agent
1￿ s best response to the given decisions of the other agents, y>1.5 The equilibrium solution
can be calculated by the backward induction algorithm for any given parameters ￿, observed




e with given X;";￿g:
In estimation of binary games, I need only one error component for each agent, which
governs the relative di⁄erence in agent j￿ s payo⁄between the two options, because, in general,
the payo⁄from both options are unobservable and what one can infer from observed decisions
5yj in this paper denotes not a strategy pro￿le but the revealed decision of agent j. In the SPNE concept,
a strategy is de￿ned at every decision node of a game tree, so here an agent￿ s strategy cannot be expressed
as a binary variable except for agent J. An agent￿ s deviation from y￿ holding the others￿decisions ￿xed
does not necessarily mean that all the others make the same decision; it means the others follow the same
strategy.
10concerns only the relative comparison of two payo⁄s. Hence I require normalization, such as
"2ji = 0, without loss of generality, and let "ji ￿ "1ji. It may be likely that "1ji and "2ji are
correlated, but the unobserved components that a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t in the same way can
be ignored in comparing the two payo⁄s.
I assume a normal distribution for "ji as a requirement for using the GHK simulator.
However, the variance structure within a market can be very ￿ exible. To demonstrate this
point, I add a market-speci￿c e⁄ect as a simple extension and the component unobserved to
the econometrician is thus speci￿ed as:
"ji = !￿ji + ￿￿i. (4)
￿ji and ￿i are assumed to be independent of Xi, and are independently and identically
distributed in standard normal distribution across ￿rms and markets, respectively. ￿i mea-
sures market-speci￿c factors that make choosing "move" more attractive for all agents in
market i. This speci￿cation is only for demonstration and not crucial for the use of the
following estimation method. In the literature of probit models, applications of the GHK
simulator cover more ￿ exible error structures, such as the multi-period Probit, multivariate
rank ordered Probit, multi-period Tobit, and so on. In most cases, the payo⁄s are modeled
scale-free.6 Unless the level of payo⁄s is identi￿ed, ! and ￿ are not separately identi￿ed and
thus normalization is necessary, for example !2 + ￿2 = 1, so ! =
p
1 ￿ ￿2. Normalization
6An exception is Maruyama (2008), in which pro￿t functions are modeled such that the level of variable
pro￿ts is identi￿ed from demand-side estimation.
11does not a⁄ect the argument below.
The estimation relies on the maximum likelihood estimation method. Each game (e.g.
each market) is the unit for which the individual likelihood is de￿ned. Denote the observed
market con￿guration as yo
i. The log-likelihood function can be written as














where ￿ is the vector of model parameters, (￿;￿).
However, the probability in the likelihood does not have an analytical solution due to
multidimensional integrals. Unless the dimension of the unobservable factors, namely the
number of agents and alternative options in a market, is very small, numerical approximation,
such as quadrature methods, is impractical. Following the literature, I discuss the use of the
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) method.7
3 Applying the GHK Simulator
3.1 Maximum Simulated Likelihood with the Crude Frequency
Simulator
The most straightforward simulator for MSL is the crude frequency simulator, also called
the accept-reject simulator and ￿rst proposed by Lerman and Manski (1981). The simulator
7Method of simulated scores (MSS) is another option, because calculating the derivative of the likelihood
is analytically straightforward. MSS may improve e¢ ciency by removing simulation bias that results from
the logarithm in the log likelihood function (Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998)).
12they explore for discrete choice models is:




































where the simulation procedure takes R sets of random draws from the assumed distribution.
In the framework of this paper, for each simulation draw r, a unique simulated equilibrium
market con￿guration yr￿
i is generated for each market i based on data for the market, given
payo⁄ function parameters, ￿, and the values of the random draws from a multivariate
normal distribution, "r
i.
Although this simulator provides estimates that are consistent with R and N, the prob-
ability estimate constructed by this simulator is a discontinuous function of the parameters
and is not bounded away from 0 and 1. The use of the indicator function makes its variance
quite large. Due to these problems, Lerman and Manski ￿nd that their estimator requires a
very large number of simulations for satisfactory performance. Moreover, the discontinuity of
the likelihood function requires an optimization method that does not require di⁄erentiability
of the optimand, such as the nonlinear simplex algorithm of Nelder and Mead (1964).
However, the use of backward induction requires the estimation procedure to compare
payo⁄s at every decision node every time the procedure evaluates the likelihood. Thus,
a likelihood evaluation is very expensive and simple discontinuous simulators that require
many simulation draws are practically infeasible in estimating large asymmetric games.
133.2 The Modi￿ed GHK Simulator
The sequential GHK, the simulator I propose, is an extension of the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) simulator. The GHK is a smooth recursive conditioning simulator and is useful
in many cases where the log-likelihood function involves high dimensional integrals with the
multivariate normal distribution. The GHK algorithm draws recursively from truncated
univariate normal distributions, and relies on the decomposition:
f(v1;:::;vJ) = f(v1)f(v2jv1):::f(vJ￿1jvJ￿2;:::;v1)f(vJjvJ￿1;:::;v1)
along with the fact that the conditional normal density can be written as a univariate nor-
mal distribution. The GHK simulator produces probability estimates that are bounded away
from 0 and 1. The estimates are continuous and di⁄erentiable with respect to parameters,
because each contribution is continuous and di⁄erentiable. It is also an unbiased estimator
of individual likelihood, l(￿;￿;yo
i;Xi). It has a smaller variance than the crude frequency
simulator, because each element is bounded away from 0 and 1. Currently, the GHK simu-
lator appears to be the most accurate simulator available for a given computation time and
the most widely used probit simulator. The discussion below explains how this powerful
simulator works and how to apply this simulator to the case in which strategic interactions
exist in a sequential game.
The GHK simulator relies on the Cholesky triangular decomposition to decompose the
multivariate normal distribution into a set of univariate normal distributions. The multi-
14variate normal disturbance vector de￿ned above, "i; can be rewritten as:
"i = ￿i￿i
where ￿i is a (Ji + 1) ￿ 1 vector of independent standard normal variables,
￿i ￿ N(0;IJi+1)

















Thus, "i can be rewritten as:
"i ￿ N(0;￿i);
8More ￿ exible variance structures can be addressed by changing ￿i and the size of ￿i.
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It follows that, using the Cholesky decomposition, "i can be written as:
"i = L(￿i) ￿ vi; (8)
where L(￿) is the lower-triangular Cholesky factor of ￿, or LL0 = ￿, and vi is another
multivariate standard normal vector:
vi ￿ N(0;IJi):









where n(:) is the probability density function of the multivariate normal distribution. This
16expression involves multiple integrals, which are di¢ cult to compute. The general objective
here is to obtain random draws from the distribution of "i subject to yo = y￿(X;";￿;￿). To
do so, ￿rst rewrite the probability expression that explicitly expresses the rectangle in which

























> 0 if yo
j = 1





Recall the form of the payo⁄ function, (1).
￿j(yj = 1;X;"￿j;y￿j;￿) = ￿(yj = 1;y￿j;X;￿) + "j
￿j(yj = 0;X;"￿j;y￿j;￿) = ￿(yj = 0;y￿j;X;￿)
The condition for agent j to satisfy yo = y￿(X;";￿;￿) is:
if y
o














































j;bj = 1 if yo
j = 1







17(9) can be rewritten as:
Pr[y
o = y
￿(X;￿;￿)] = Pr[for 8j, aj(y
o;X;"<j;￿) ￿ "j ￿ bj(y
o;X;"<j;￿)]:
This expression shows us the rectangle in which the event, yo = y￿(X;￿;￿), occurs. The
essential di⁄erence from the regular multivariate probit case, which involves no strategic
interaction, is that the size of the rectangle, which is determined by the values of a and b,
depends on the values of " as well. However, it does not depend on the error terms of all
other agents. The idea behind the use of the GHK simulator is that, to obtain the interval
of "j, we only need "<j, because the decisions of the upstream agents are given for agent j.
When agent j makes a decision, only the random components of the downstream agents are
relevant to predicting the downstream responses to each of agent j￿ s options. By using the



















where ￿() is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution.
18Now we are ready to apply the GHK simulator. For each simulation, prepare a vector of
independent uniform (0;1) random variables, (u1;:::;uJi). De￿ne the following function:
q(u;a;b) ￿ ￿
￿1 (￿(a) ￿ (1 ￿ u) + ￿(b) ￿ u), (11)
where 0 < u < 1 and ￿ 1 ￿ a < b ￿ 1:
This function, q(￿), is a mapping that takes a uniform (0;1) random variable into a truncated
standard normal random variate on the interval [a;b].
The property of sequential games that is exploited here is that, when making a decision,
an agent only considers the responses of its downstream agents. For each agent, the deci-
sions of its preceding agents are all given. From agent 1￿ s perspective, there is no strategic
interaction. For given yo;X;u;￿;L, recursively de￿ne a sequence of simulated vj so as to
satisfy yo = y￿(X;";￿;￿) for j = 1;:::;J:









e v2 ￿ q
￿
u2;
a2(e v1) ￿ L2;1e v1
L22
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e vJ ￿ q
￿
uJ;
aJ(e v<J￿1) ￿ LJ;1e v1::: ￿ LJ;J￿1e vJ￿1
LJJ
;
bJ(e v<J￿1) ￿ LJ;1e v1::: ￿ LJ;J￿1e vJ￿1
LJJ
￿
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L22
￿ v2 ￿
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LJJ
￿ vJ ￿

























Qj(e v1r;:::;e vJ￿1;r): (12)
The model can be estimated by solving the following maximum simulated likelihood problem:





























The literature has developed a general consensus that the GHK simulator is accurate
20in approximating discrete choice probabilities, especially when considering the low compu-
tational e⁄ort required. The combination of the recursive conditioning approach and the
smooth univariate truncated variate generation algorithm produces an unbiased (for any
value of R) multivariate probability simulator of l(￿) that is smooth, i.e., a continuous and
di⁄erentiable function of the model parameters. A key intuition behind this excellent feature
is that the Cholesky triangularization underlying the GHK method implies an importance-
sampling distribution that, while computationally extremely tractable, provides an excellent
approximation to the true correlation structure of the unobservable factors. Most of the
computational e⁄ort involved for this simulator comes from drawing the univariate truncated
normal variates. This e⁄ort is approximately linear in K, the dimension of the probability
integral. This is a remarkable advantage of this simulator. For the detailed performance and
properties of this simulator, see, for example, B￿rsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) and
Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998).
The GHK simulator has so far been used in applications with no explicit strategic in-
teractions. This is because the original GHK simulator can deal with interactions across j
through the disturbance structure, but not strategic interactions across j, which is clearly a
limitation to address strategic interactions in general, because not only an agent￿ s random
component but also his decision a⁄ect the decisions of the others. For example, Chernew,
Gowrisankaran, and Fendrick (2002) use the GHK simulator in their entry model of hospitals,
but strategic interactions are not taken into account in the empirical model speci￿cation.
By exploiting the nature of sequential-move games, that an agent only speculates about the
21decisions of the downstream agents, the discussion in this section showed that the GHK
simulator can be extended to the cases with strategic interactions without losing any virtues
of the simulator.
4 Discussion
4.1 The Relevance of the Sequential-Move Setup
The sequential-move game approach presented in this paper is restrictive in the sense that
it explicitly requires an exogenous decision order. A much more commonly used setup in
empirical studies of discrete games is the incomplete-information simultaneous-move game.
In principle, a researcher should choose a game speci￿cation according to the environment
in which the data are generated. The choice is obvious for some cases. For example, some
experiments or well-designed auctions may stipulate a clear decision order. Such cases,
however, are rare. In most cases, both simultaneous games and sequential games are merely
ad-hoc approximations and the reality might lie somewhere in between.
In theory, the simultaneous approach is more general in the sense that any sequential-
move game can be expressed as a simultaneous game. However, constructing and estimating
such simultaneous-move games is not practical, because the size of the choice set of each
agent rapidly grows as the number of players or alternatives increases. Thus, in practice, the
interactions captured by the two approaches are di⁄erent.
In choosing a speci￿cation, the following should be considered. Background details of
22the game and data, such as institutional speci￿cs, behavioral models and frequencies of
observed points in time (aggregation of decision processes over time) may facilitate the
choice. Computational feasibility is also practically important. For large asymmetric games
of perfect information, the method proposed in this paper o⁄ers signi￿cant computational
advantages. The subgame perfect equilibrium concept precludes existence and multiplicity
issues and the use of the sequential GHK in a one-step direct estimation simpli￿es the
estimation procedure and provides e¢ cient estimates in a reasonable amount of time.
Furthermore, explicit treatment of the sequential nature of interactions is a noticeable
feature of this approach. In application, quantifying ￿rst mover￿ s advantage is possible.
The decision order assumption may be ad hoc, but the computational advantages allow
researchers to test di⁄erent orders, including a randomized order. In this way, researchers
can infer whether the sequential nature is relevant to their particular subject, and, if relevant,
which decision order ￿ts the data. This is another advantage of the proposed approach.
4.2 Extensions
The framework I present in this paper can be used in more general settings. Increasing
the number of alternatives available to each agent is a straightforward extension, at least
conceptually. A general approach is to assign an additional error term for each additional
alternative. Within the decision turn of each agent, the order of simulation draws for each of
his alternatives is arbitrary, as the same as the regular GHK simulator. However, this may
make the estimation time-consuming, because adding another alternative to each agent￿ s
23decision considerably increases the number of required draws. The same applies for panel
data. Even if there is no inter-temporal interaction across an agent￿ s decisions over time, the
existence of serial correlation in the error components considerably increases the number of
necessary draws, though the same method can still be used.
Relaxing the assumption of perfect information is possible within the scope of this paper,
as long as (1) the distribution of each agent￿ s private information is common knowledge
and (2) each agent￿ s payo⁄ depends only on his own realized random component and the
decisions of the other agents. This incomplete-information game is conceptually simpler,
because each agent predicts the downstream moves by using expected values and the agent￿ s
decision does not depend on the realization of random components in downstream. This
implies that the proposed sequential GHK becomes the regular GHK. Computation may
or may not become more cumbersome. While the lack of sequential dependency through
random components simpli￿es the calculation, the backward calculation of expected payo⁄s
of each agent is necessary. Incorporating mixed strategy is computationally impractical and
beyond the scope of the proposed approach.
Can the proposed method be applied to dynamic games? The analysis of dynamic
decision-making with strategic interactions is a rapidly growing area of research (Aguirre-
gabiria and Mira (2007) and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007)). The estimation of dynamic
games is essential in analyzing aspects that the static approach cannot provide identi￿cation
for. For example, a dynamic game is used to recover the costs of investment or entry in an
oligopolistic market. Most of this literature employs incomplete-information simultaneous-
24move games.
While the estimation method in this paper captures a certain aspect of dynamic decision-
making or inter-temporal dependence, the empirical approach is quite similar to the classical
static entry analysis, where a cross-sectional data set is used and each agent makes a decision
only once. However, there are several ways to analyze a dynamic feature of multi-period data.
First, when the choice of agents is assumed to be a one-time irreversible decision and the
order of such possible irreversible decisions is exogenously given, the framework in this paper
can be applied to a multi-period data set. This is the idea of Schmidt-Dengler (2006), the
work that analyzes the timing of adoption of MRIs in the hospital industry and employed the
perfect-information sequential-move game framework. In this setting, the empirical question
can be viewed as when each agent makes a move after the preceding agent￿ s move, and
the model is estimated using a panel data set. The second type of possible application
utilizes the fact that a sequential-move game can be viewed as a series of one single agent￿ s
repetitive decision-making. There is not interaction among agents but sequential inter-
temporal dependence, i.e. an agent￿ s payo⁄ in each single period is partly determined by
his decision in the previous periods. Third, more generally, repetitive decision-making by
multiple agents over multiple periods can be modeled in the same manner. This extension
does not alter the nature of the framework, but, because the computational burden becomes
signi￿cant, the number of time points and/or agents has to be small. In all these potential
applications, the key requirements are: (1) the order of sequence is exogenous and (2) there
is no uncertainty from the agent￿ s perspective.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I develop a computationally practical and e¢ cient estimation method for em-
pirical models of discrete-choice sequential-move games. Based on a simulation assisted es-
timation approach, I propose the sequential GHK, an extension of the GHK simulator. This
method allows researchers to empirically study strategic interactions in a large asymmetric
game. Speci￿cally, researchers can infer the existence and degree of strategic complemen-
tarity and perform counterfactual simulations that explicitly take strategic interactions into
account. The decision sequence that best ￿ts the data can also be investigated. The method
can be applied to other ￿elds. In industrial organization, the possibilities span entry, product
choice, auction, advertisement, investment, and so on. Games played in household settings,
politics, and international relations can also be studied with this framework.
Appendix: Computing Miscellanea
Because the modi￿cation of the GHK simulator proposed in this paper does not a⁄ect the
continuity and di⁄erentiability of the GHK, standard maximization routines can be used in
estimation. When taking random draws, variance reduction techniques, such as antithetics
or the Halton procedure, can be used as usual.
26Some computing techniques are helpful in speeding up the computation. The unneces-
sary part of the calculation of the backward induction algorithm can be skipped by using
assumptions of payo⁄functions that are made by economic theory. For example, Maruyama
(2007) exploits the non-increasing property of the pro￿t function in the number of entering
rival ￿rms and decreases the computation time by more than 95 percent. From the program-
ming perspective, another useful technique is the use of the recursive function command.9
When the number of agents varies across observations, this technique is extremely helpful in
e¢ ciently executing the backward induction algorithm.
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